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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the problems experienced by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
with international ambitions in gaining access to debt and equity finance for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) projects. We develop several arguments why such small businesses are 
expected to face severe financing constraints for foreign investments and provide an 
explorative empirical analysis of these issues for a sample of thirty-two Belgian SMEs. We 
find that the market of FDI finance for SMEs is subject to considerable capital market 
imperfections. The information problems, lack of collateral, the home bias of financiers and 
the capital gearing method used by banks to evaluate small firms' foreign projects give rise to 
financial constraints. The FDI finance gap hinders SMEs in their internationalization strategy 
and negatively affects their economic performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A remarkable and extremely important business phenomenon of the 20th century was 
the internationalization of large and small as well as established and new venture firms 
(Sapienza, Autio, George, and Zahra 2005). Next to the fact that young and small firms 
increasingly tend to internationalize, another novel element of the globalisation trend has been 
the impressive rise in foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet, it is widely acknowledged that 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in general, are subject to substantial financing 
constraints1, which may potentially hinder exploiting their full growth potential. In this paper, 
we examine if SMEs that invest in foreign countries face even more severe finance 
constraints.  
Nowadays, the majority of SMEs in almost all industries face growing competition 
due to internationalization (European Commission 2003a). Even primarily domestically 
oriented SMEs must operate internationally in order to guarantee their competitiveness and 
viability (Etemad 1999). During the most recent years, SMEs have taken up an increasingly 
active international role (Oviatt and McDougall 1994, 1999). As the world economy is 
becoming gradually more integrated, internationalization and FDI activities are likely to gain 
further momentum (Lu and Beamish 2001). A financial environment that supports SMEs' 
growth is an indispensable condition for the success of small businesses. By extension, 
inadequate access to external finance improperly hampers economic growth and welfare. 
Many countries spend substantial sums of public money to moderate equity and debt 
gaps that are assumed to be present, particularly among small firms. A wide range of policy 
schemes, such as direct loans, interest subsidies and loan guarantees, have been established to 
alleviate finance rationing of SMEs (Cressy 1996; European Commission 2003a). FDI credits 
for SMEs are available in several countries, which suggest the existence of capital market 
imperfections for international investment. However, apart from anecdotal evidence, there is 
little empirical verification of the alleged FDI finance gap. Notwithstanding the huge 
relevance and economic importance of foreign investment, FDI financing decisions in SMEs 
have received comparatively little academic attention. Interest in large mature multinational 
firms as the unit of analysis dominates the international business literature (Coviello and 
McAuley 1999). Furthermore, most research on internationalization does not focus on FDI but 
                                               
 
1
 Financing constraints are present when a firm is not able to raise a sufficient amount of finance in time at a fair 
price that reflects the true risk of the project/company financed. 
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on other types of international activities, like export, or focus on internationalization problems 
experienced by specific companies, for instance high-tech firms.  
Whether SMEs that pursue FDI activities indeed experience these hypothesized 
financing gaps is an important research question, as it is widely known that financial 
constraints have real impact. For instance, capital market imperfections negatively affect the 
number of entrepreneurial initiatives (Evans and Jovanovic 1989), drive down firm growth 
and economic viability (Bates 1990; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994b). Financing 
constraints that SMEs face for their foreign investments may severely hurt their growth 
potential. Obtaining sufficient financing serves as a buffer against unforeseen setbacks and 
allows SMEs to explore and exploit a broad range of challenging foreign investment activities 
(Westhead, Wright, and Ucbasaran 2001). SMEs that suffer from financing constraints will 
rather internationalize in less capital intensive ways, and rather export than opt for FDI; 
hence, they will be inhibited to exploit their full growth prospects (Stopford and Wells 1972).  
For SMEs, attracting external financing for domestic projects already presents a 
challenge. We conjecture that the extra risks that foreign projects include, together with the 
increase in informational problems, result in a failure of the private market to finance FDI 
projects for SMEs. We argue that many of the financing difficulties are similar in nature to 
those experienced by firms seeking finance for R&D projects: volatile returns, asymmetric 
information and a lack of collateral cause SMEs to have poor access to debt for their FDI 
projects. Moreover, financiers are likely to suffer from a home bias and the evaluation 
methods used by banks to assess these projects may present a further impediment to attracting 
finance. 
In order to obtain insight in the issues that SMEs face in attracting FDI financing, we 
provide an explorative empirical study with both the demand and supply side of FDI finance. 
We have interviewed thirty-two Belgian SMEs that (consider) carry(ing) out FDI; in addition, 
we have interviewed five banks and five venture capitalists. Based on the interviews with the 
SMEs, we have composed a questionnaire that was sent to the very same SMEs that have been 
interviewed. This allowed us to obtain a more complete understanding of all FDI financing 
issues these firms are confronted with. Belgium offers an interesting setting to carry out this 
study as international business research has highlighted that firms from small countries have a 
lengthy tradition and noticeable experience in internationalization (Jones 1996). Moreover, 
the financial environment in Belgium is typical for Continental Europe: a bank-based system, 
with relatively underdeveloped capital markets, and a rather immature venture capital 
industry. 
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We find considerable support for our proposition. Severe capital market imperfections 
exist for financing SMEs' foreign projects and prevent small firms from realizing their full 
growth potential. Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. To our 
knowledge, this is the first academic article on SME-FDI finance. We provide insights in the 
financing of FDI by small firms and develop theoretical arguments for the financing 
constraints they face for investing abroad. We document the existence of these alleged 
financing gaps and explore their nature. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on financing 
constraints and FDI, and develops our proposition. Subsequently, we describe the 
methodology and sample used. Next, we present the results of our empirical research. The 
paper ends with a discussion of the findings and potential avenues for future research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROPOSITION DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, we first review the literature on financing gaps for large and small 
firms and on the effects of internationalization/foreign investment on firm performance. Then, 
we combine elements from both reviews in order to develop why we hypothesize severe 
financing constraints to be present for SMEs that want to carry out FDI.   
 
Financing constraints for large and small firms  
An extensive literature documents the relationship between internal resources and firm 
investment (Hubbard 1998; Harrison and McMillan 2003). In business surveys companies 
repeatedly allude to the lack of external finance as a major obstacle to their investment and 
innovation activities (Harhoff and Körting 1998). These findings suggest the presence of 
finance rationing phenomena, which are typically considered as problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection due to information asymmetry (Akerlof 1970; Leland and Pyle 1977). Jaffee 
and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks may ration credit rather 
than increase interest rates to clear the market as the latter may deter good borrowers and 
result in incentive problems. In equity markets, Myers and Majluf (1984) describe why firms 
may need to sell new stock at a discount ('lemon' premium). Financing constraints occur for 
various types of firms and/or projects, for example for starting entrepreneurs (Evans and 
Leighton 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994a) and innovative projects like R&D 
(Arrow 1962; Himmelberg and Petersen 1994; Hall 2002). Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
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(1988) even find evidence of significant capital market imperfections for publicly traded 
manufacturing firms in developed markets. 
Several empirical studies report evidence that financing constraints have a greater 
impact on the investment behaviour of small firms (Hall 1992; Berger and Udell 1998) and 
that SMEs' growth is determined by their access to internal finance (Spence 1979; Moore 
1993). The European Commission has acknowledged the financing difficulties, both for 
equity and debt, of smaller firms and recognizes the existence of a market failure due to 
information problems and transaction costs (European Commission 2003b). As a result of the 
financing gaps, small firms tend to rely more on self-financing, have lower liquidity and 
leverage, seldom issue equity, and rely more on short-term bank financing, trade credit and 
owner loans (Bates 1971; Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson 1996). The efficient and effective 
provision of finance is fundamental in ensuring that SMEs can exploit their growth 
opportunities. A positive association exists between external finance and business 
performance (Keasey and McGuiness 1990). We next present a number of reasons that 
account for the financing issues that SMEs regularly encounter. 
First, SMEs are disadvantaged in a number of aspects compared to large firms. They 
have a smaller pool of financial and managerial resources to survive critical periods. SMEs 
have a shorter expected life, may face intergenerational transfer problems and are expected to 
be less profitable (Pettit and Singer 1985; Ang 1992). Large firms usually have better-trained 
management, advantages in raising capital, more favourable tax conditions and government 
regulations, and can better compete for qualified labour (Brüderl and Schussler 1990; Cressy 
and Olofsson 1997). Empirically, failure rates are notably higher for SMEs (Brüderl, 
Preisendörfer, and Ziegler 1992). 
Second, agency and asymmetric information problems may be more pronounced for 
small firms. Agency costs can expected to be higher as a small business manager is likely to 
put his own and his firm's interest first. Additionally, solutions to agency problems are more 
costly to SMEs, thereby raising the transaction costs between small businesses and their 
financiers. Moreover, the fixed cost element of transactions puts small firms at a disadvantage 
(Coase 1937). Monitoring SMEs is more difficult and expensive as information on them is 
less easily available, they have less credit history, are subject to less rigorous reporting 
requirements and the quality of their financial statements may vary (Pettit and Singer 1985). 
Furthermore, employing bonding methods like incentive schemes may be complex for SMEs 
(Michaelas, Chittenden, and Poutziouris 1999). All these elements result in SMEs often facing 
difficulties in signalling their creditworthiness.  
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For SMEs, access to external equity has long been identified as a problem (Macmillan 
1931; Radcliffe 1959; Bolton 1971; Wilson 1979). In general, SMEs do not have access to 
capital markets. First, a stock market flotation is relatively more expensive to arrange for 
smaller issues (Lee, Lockhead, Ritter, and Zhao 1996). Second, initial public offerings of 
smaller firms are subject to higher underpricing (Buckland and Davis 1990). Venture 
capitalists (VCs), as specialized financial intermediaries, may mitigate the substantial 
information problems that prevail in SMEs. However, Sahlman (1990) presents evidence that 
venture capital (VC) is very expensive. In addition, VCs back only a tiny fraction of all new 
ventures.2 Besides, the VC market in Continental Europe is relatively underdeveloped 
compared to Anglosaxon countries. Moreover, due to the high fixed costs of monitoring, 
especially small businesses are not very attractive to VCs (Scholtens 1999). Furthermore, 
despite the scarce availability and the high cost of bank loans, it has been well established in 
the small business literature that SME owner-managers are reluctant to sell equity to outsiders 
and give up independence and control (Jordan, Lowe, and Taylor 1998; Giudici and Paleari 
2000). This control aversion is more important for smaller firms; obviously, this demand-side 
financial constraint further increases financing issues for SMEs.  
As a consequence of the persistence of an equity gap for small businesses, the bulk 
relies for external funding upon bank debt (Binks and Ennew 1996). However, regarding bank 
loans, SMEs find themselves again in a deprived position compared to large firms. Small 
firms are more constrained in the use of control mechanisms, as collateral, long-term 
relationship and reputation that ease information problems. For instance, collateralization may 
under some circumstances contribute to attenuate credit rationing problems; collateral serves 
as both a signalling device to overcome adverse selection and as an incentive device to 
overcome moral hazard (Bester 1985). Yet, the potential to put up collateral depends on the 
industry and on the asset specificity of the firm. The younger and smaller a firm, the less it is 
able to pledge collateral. Furthermore, SMEs usually are less capital intensive than large ones. 
The intangibility of the assets, an important characteristic of start-up and small firms, also 
impedes this control mechanism (Scholtens 1999). Pledging personal collateral in the form of 
a guarantee offers only a partial solution as it is limited in supply (Giudici and Paleari 2000). 
Despite the fact that SMEs generally lack sufficient collateral, lending to SMEs is more often 
based on pledging collateral (Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson 1996).  
                                               
 
2
 For instance, in 1997, a record year for US venture disbursements, 707 companies received first-round venture 
financing, while 885,000 businesses were started in the US (Lerner 1999). 
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Internationalization-FDI and firm performance 
While exporting is still very significant, during the last decade internationalisation has 
become a much more differentiated activity that is critical for achieving competitiveness. 30% 
of European SMEs have foreign supply relationships, 18% export, 3% have collaborative 
relationships with foreign firms, and 3% have established foreign subsidiaries (European 
Commission 2003a). Some of the principal drivers for the growing internationalization of 
SMEs are rooted in political, economic and technological evolutions. Numerous countries 
opened up their economies during the 1990s; trade and investment liberalization programs far 
outnumbered more restrictive measures. An increasing number of people has become more 
internationally mobile. Furthermore, the rising homogenization of markets in distant countries 
has made international business more accessible for everyone (Madsen and Servais 1997). 
Spectacular increases in the speed, quality and cost efficiency of international communication 
and transportation have greatly reduced the transaction costs of multinational business (Porter 
1990). Consequently, exploring and exploiting international business opportunities is no 
longer the preserve of large corporations (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). An ever quicker 
economic and technological pace urges typical SMEs to lever their competencies abroad, 
especially when they operate in undersized domestic markets (Etemad 2004). Few small firms 
can avoid foreign competition and many of them are thus imposed to adopt an international 
perspective (Ohmae 1990).  
Many advantages associated with internationalization are well documented in the 
literature. Geographic diversification offers a range of exploration and exploitation benefits 
(Lu and Beamish 2001). Internationalizing firms may realize economies of scale and scope 
(Hymer 1976), reduce fluctuations in revenue by spreading investment risks over different 
countries (Kim, Hwang, and Burgers 1993), reduce costs and boost revenues by increasing 
market power (Kogut 1985). They have the opportunity to exploit market imperfections in the 
cross-border use of firm-specific assets (Caves 1971). FDI in specific permits the leverage of 
various ownership and/or location-based advantages such as a competitively priced labour 
force, access to critical resources and development of new capabilities (Dunning 1980; Lu and 
Beamish 2004). It allows to exploit firm-specific advantages or technological superiority 
(Vernon 1966), and to reduce transaction costs (Williamson 1975). 
Yet, foreign investment may be risky. A foreign firm may face some specific 
disadvantages like governmentally instituted barriers to trade and an incomplete 
understanding of local laws, language and business practices (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). 
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Many of these difficulties may be associated with the liability of foreignness (Hymer 1976) 
and newness (Stinchcombe 1965). A new subsidiary faces similar challenges as a start-up, as 
it needs to build business relationships with stakeholders, establish its legitimacy and train 
new employees to staff new operations. Due to political, economic, legal and cultural 
differences, an internationalizing firm is required to adapt its resources developed in a 
domestic context (McDougall and Oviatt 1996). FDI requires a fundamental departure from 
current business practices and increases the risks of failure (Miller 1983; Sapienza, Autio, and 
Zahra 2005). On top of increased political (Adler and Dumas 1975; He and Ng 1998) and 
exchange rate risk (Solnik 1974), Armstrong and Riddick (1998) argue that international firms 
suffer from greater agency costs and information asymmetry. It is more difficult to monitor 
managers in international markets due to geographical constraints, cultural, language and legal 
differences, multi-country financial statements and multi-country auditors (Lee and Kwok 
1988; Burgman 1996). Additionally, similar to product diversification, transaction costs 
increase with the degree of geographic diversification (Williamson 1975).   
 
SMEs, FDI and financing constraints 
Although a number of papers have revealed that exporting SMEs frequently face a 
lack of capital to finance their exports (Bilkey and Tesar 1977; Hook and Czinkota 1988; 
Crick 2004), there is not a single study in the literature that investigated the financing 
constraints SMEs experience when pursuing FDI. However, a survey by the European 
Commission showed that in particular SMEs that engage in outward internationalization 
activities may confront a shortage of capital (European Commission 2003a). 
Prior research has documented a strong predisposition of equity investors towards 
geographically and culturally proximate investments (Feldstein and Horioka 1980; Coval 
1999; Grinblatt 2001). This home bias is claimed to be due to cognitive bias towards familiar 
investments (Huberman 2001) and lower information costs (Merton 1987). Similarly, VC 
firms (and banks) rather invest (lend) in geographical areas close to their home base. As 
geographical distance rises, reducing information asymmetries between firm and financiers 
becomes more challenging (Sorenson and Stuart 2002). Moreover, VCs and banks who invest 
outside their home country need to invest resources in order to understand the local legal and 
institutional environment (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). 
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We argue that many of the issues that firms face in attracting capital for FDI are 
equivalent to those experienced by high tech firms or for financing an R&D project. 
Comparable to high tech investments, FDI is characterized by highly variable returns, 
asymmetric information and a lack of collateral; as a result, access to debt is likely to be poor. 
First, returns to FDI are volatile and skewed. As creditors do not share in the upwards states of 
nature, they only care about the left tail of the distribution of returns (Stiglitz 1985). When 
borrower returns are decidedly uncertain, extensive use of debt may result in expected losses 
for lenders (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). Second, information asymmetries between firms 
and potential investors are expected to be more pronounced for FDI projects. Foreign 
investments are hard to evaluate and insiders will likely have much better information than 
outsiders about the project's prospects. As a result, creditors may rationally decide to ration 
credit (Jaffee and Russel 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Third, like R&D investments, FDI 
often has limited collateral value. Foreign investments repeatedly incur sunk costs with little 
or no salvage value at the initial stage, such as expenses of foreign market analysis, legal 
consulting services, translation of documents, adapting products to host markets, travel 
expenses or the costs of setting up a foreign sales channel (Horst 1972; European Commission 
2003a; Fryges 2004). FDI frequently involves intangible assets or firm specific assets, and 
therefore provides little or no collateral value, as there is a higher risk of losses for creditors 
since the assets involved cannot simply be traded on other markets (Williamson 1975). A 
large body of literature demonstrates the importance of collateral for debt financing (Bester 
1985; Berger and Udell 1990; Boot, Thakor, and Udell 1991). Empirical evidence suggests a 
negative relationship between a firm's intangible assets and leverage (Gompers and Lerner 
1999). For high tech SMEs, next to all long term debt is secured (Carpenter and Petersen 
2002). Thus, the rather limited collateralizability of FDI assets restrains access to debt. SMEs 
face even greater challenges than their larger counterparts in obtaining financing for FDI. 
Small firms often have internal shortages of information, finance, management time and 
experience (Etemad 1999). These limited resources result in a higher vulnerability to 
environmental changes and a lower capacity to absorb the hazards of exploring inherently 
risky and competitive international markets (Buckley 1989). These constraints inflate the 
liabilities of foreignness and of newness and make internationalization a challenge to SMEs 
(Lu and Beamish 2001). 
Furthermore, supply-side financial constraints, in particular credit rationing, for FDI 
are likely to be worse for small firms than for large businesses. The so-called home bias of 
VCs and banks is due to information costs. Given that the costs of collecting and processing 
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information are to some extent fixed, they will tend to be more significant for SMEs. Even 
more importantly, the methods of evaluation used by banks to assess small business loans 
may give rise to financial constraints. In perfect markets all valuable projects should be 
funded (Merton 1987); therefore, the income gearing approach (used for large firms) to bank 
lending is preferable to the traditional capital gearing (used for small firms) method since it 
relies on the firm's future performance rather than on the provision of collateral. However, this 
requires the bank to understand how the firm and its markets operate; for banks, the 
assessment of future cash flows of FDI projects is often unfeasible (Binks and Ennew 1996). 
Similar to high tech investments, judging the prospects of an SME’s foreign investment might 
be challenging for a bank. High tech SMEs typically complain with banks of their limited 
competency in correctly evaluating their business potential and about the excessive amount of 
warranties required; smaller firms suffer most from these problems (Giudici and Paleari 
2000). Additionally, the income gearing approach requires the firm to provide the bank with 
up-to-date information which has been argued to be a problem. In summary, for SMEs that 
apply for a loan, banks usually rely on the capital gearing method; however, in case of FDI, 
the required collateral is often lacking. As an alternative to providing collateral, developing 
good working relationships with banks would allow SMEs to reduce information asymmetries 
and may induce banks to conduct relationship based rather than transaction based lending. 
Yet, SMEs often fail to achieve this. The empirical evidence suggests that SMEs are 
dissatisfied about the quality of service rendered by their banks and generally perceive their 
banking relationship as poor (Binks and Ennew 1996). By contrast, larger firms are prone to 
have a more established relationship with their banks, thereby enabling banks to draw on 
information produced in past lending transactions (Sharpe 1989).  
Based on the discussion of theoretical arguments presented above, we formulate our 
proposition: "SMEs experience more severe financing constraints for their FDI than for their 
domestic projects". 
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METHOD AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Method 
In order to empirically study our proposition, we have interviewed both the demand 
and supply side of SME FDI finance in the Flanders region of Belgium: thirty-two SMEs3 that 
are involved in FDI projects, five banks and five venture capitalists. To examine FDI finance 
issues, it is imperative to choose a market in which the majority of SMEs operate in multiple 
countries. Smaller countries with open economies but small domestic markets are more 
internationalized (European Commission 2003a). Multicountry activity is widespread in small 
European countries like Belgium, even among independent, owner-managed companies 
(Sapienza, De Clercq, and Sandberg 2005). 
Accordingly, our population contains all Belgian SMEs that pursue foreign direct 
investments. In our study, we are only interested in productive FDI; thus, for instance, 
opening up a foreign sales office is not included as this requires less capital and has a different 
risk profile than true productive foreign investments (for example, set up a new plant). It is 
infeasible to find a listing of all SMEs that pursue productive FDI, so we have contacted 
several sources in order to compose our sample. The Belgian Corporation for International 
Investment4 (BCCI), the Entrepreneurship, Governance and Strategy Competence Centre at 
the Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School, the Cabinet of Economic Affairs, and sector 
federations like Agoria5 and Febeltex6 all provided us their records of companies planning to 
invest in FDI. Flanders Investments & Trade (FIT), a government agency promoting 
sustainable international business, forwarded us a list of firms that were registered for 
participating in a seminar on financing and insurance of foreign investments. Also, we asked 
the SMEs that we interviewed, if possible, whether they knew other SMEs involved in foreign 
investments. Despite the fact that we could count on several sources of information, it turned 
out to be hard to identify SMEs suitable for our research. First, smaller firms are notably less 
internationalized than their larger counterparts, and the difference is particularly manifest for 
                                               
 
3
 According to EU directives, SMEs are firms that employ less than 250 people, report sales of less than 50 
million euro or alternatively report an accounting asset value of less than 40 million euro. Additionally, the 
SMEs in our sample had to comply with an independence criterion: no more than 25% of their equity capital 
must be owned by one or several companies (see Giudici and Paleari 2000). 
4
 BCCI is a government-supported investment company whose main objective is to co-invest and to provide 
long-term co-financing of foreign investments by Belgian companies. 
5
 Agoria is Belgium's largest employers' organisation and trade association; it represents companies active in the 
technology industry. 
6
 Febeltex is Belgium’s employers' organization of industrial textile manufacturing companies. 
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more complex forms of internationalization like FDI (European Commission 2003a). Second, 
a large part of FDI does not involve productive investments. 
We identified 130 firms that were considered to be SMEs carrying out productive FDI. 
An email was sent to all these firms informing them about our research project. Afterwards, 
all firms have been contacted by phone and we checked whether they met our sample criteria. 
32 SMEs met our requirements and were willing to cooperate. We have interviewed the 
owner/manager of each firm. Financial data and other firm characteristics were looked up in 
advance through annual reports and the firm’s website. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with the respondents, lasting between 1 and 1.5 hours. These enabled us to develop 
a questionnaire, which we pretested with SME experts and academics and with one SME 
owner. After reviewing the questionnaire, it was sent to all SME owners previously 
interviewed. Next to providing general information about the SME and its foreign projects, 
owner-managers were asked to report how they finance FDI and to score a broad range of 
statements or items on a 5 point Likert scale (with 1=totally disagree, and 5=totally agree). 
The goal of the questionnaire was to propose a full range of statements to the SME owners in 
order to explore their FDI financing issues. 23 questionnaires have been filled out and 
returned to us. In addition to examining the demand side of FDI finance for SMEs, we also 
explored the question from the perspective of the supply side, as a check on the validity of the 
results obtained with SMEs. SMEs might have reasons to report financing difficulties and 
exacerbate the extent of the financing constraints they face, for instance to induce the 
government to provide cheap FDI finance. Five banks and five venture capitalists have been 
interviewed; we spoke to both large and smaller banks, to banks with a general focus and with 
a specific focus on small and medium sized businesses. Similarly, we have interviewed large 
and small VCs with varying investment profiles.  
 
Description of the sample 
Our sample is active in a wide range of industries. Table 1 provides an overview 
according to the Nace Bel industry classification scheme. Several firms operate in more than 
one industry.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Some important characteristics of the firms that returned the questionnaire are reported 
in Table 2. The average number of employees at the end of 2005 was 165. Average sales 
totaled 22.1 million euro, while the mean total assets amounted to 14.0 million euro. By the 
end of 2005, two firms in our sample have become quite large and do not meet the SME 
criteria any longer. However, we have explicitly asked these firms to talk about their FDI 
finance issues during the time they were small or medium sized. Moreover, when they carried 
out their most recent international investment, they still met all SME criteria. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
All of the firms surveyed export. On average, 47% of their sales are generated in other 
countries. 96% of the SMEs have foreign suppliers; 43% of their purchases are made abroad. 
We asked the SMEs about their most recent foreign direct investment. The average 
investment equals 1,482,985 euro (median: 575,000 euro), and is mainly invested in property, 
plant and equipment. Table 3 gives an overview of the country of investment. Continental and 
Eastern Europe and China are the two most popular regions. Half of the sample already had 
experience with FDI before their latest transaction. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The SMEs in our sample indicated that they pursue FDI projects to reduce 
transportation costs, import/export taxes, benefit from incentives offered by the host country, 
enhanced payment processing and sales potential, favourable tax conditions, and to create a 
better access to neighbouring countries. FDI also enables easier adaptation to local cultural, 
political and economic conditions, and permits to avoid the home country’s regulatory burden 
and high costs of infrastructure or labour.  
Our respondents indicated a mean risk score of their latest FDI project (compared to a 
similar domestic project) of 3.24, which suggests that the foreign investment is not perceived 
as particularly risky. Moreover, as the SMEs acknowledge the potential risks of FDI they try 
to control them by a profound analysis of the foreign project. Though modern communication 
tools like internet and webcams allow better monitoring of the foreign investment, SMEs 
prefer to invest in geographically proximate countries. Several firms noted that a ‘do nothing 
strategy’ is risky as well in the current economic environment. 
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RESULTS 
This section reports results and analyses drawn from the surveys, together with 
qualitative information provided during the interviews. We start by providing a summary of 
the results of our sample's financing constraints. Subsequently, we elaborate upon the 
financing sources for FDI and any financing constraints perceived. Finally, we present our 
findings obtained from interviewing the supply side of FDI finance. 
 
Summary of the results 
As shown in Table 4, the SMEs in our sample report facing considerable financing 
constraints for FDI projects (mean score: 3.61), which negatively impacts their growth 
potential (3.57). The same SMEs report limited financing constraints for their domestic 
projects (2.26). They claim that the problems experienced for foreign investment are more 
severe than for large firms (4.00), and than for attracting finance for domestic projects (3.77). 
For foreign projects, SMEs make use of suboptimal and expensive sources of finance to a 
larger extent than for domestic projects since they cannot attract standard types of financing 
(2.74 versus 1.82). Overall, small firms observe a failure in the private market to finance their 
FDI projects (3.94). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
We have collected data about owner-managers' characteristics, like education, working 
experience, age, and about the SME ('s FDI), like founding date, industry, size, number of 
employees, region of investment and previous FDI activity. We could not detect any 
significant relationships between these factors and SMEs' FDI financing constraints due to our 
limited sample size.7  
 
                                               
 
7
 For instance, we find a (statistically insignificant) negative relationship between proxies for firm size and the 
FDI financing difficulties reported, and a mitigating effect of previous experience with foreign investment on 
SMEs’ financial constraints regarding international investment.      
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Financing of the FDI project 
We have analyzed how SMEs finance their foreign investments; we discuss 
impediments to the use of local/domestic bank finance, and to raising internal/external equity. 
At the end, we present our findings on the use of government grants and partnerships.      
 
Internal financing. 42.9% of the respondents indicate that their most recent FDI 
project was entirely funded by internal cash flows. Furthermore, 50.0% mainly finance their 
latest foreign investment with internal funds. Thus, generating sufficient internal funds is 
critical in financing FDI. These results may already hint to the presence of financing 
constraints: the relationship between internal cash generation and investment activity is a 
common measure of financing gaps in the literature (Hall 2002). Simply focusing on the mean 
score reported by our respondents might be misleading and may hide the fact that FDI 
financing issues are not homogenous for all SMEs. A score of around 3 may be the result of 
averaging out scores of 1 (no issue at all for some firms) and scores of 5 (a severe issue for 
other firms). Thus, we also examine the percentage of sampled SMEs that report fully 
agreeing with a statement.  
Table 5 indicates that many of our respondents would have trouble financing the FDI 
project in case of insufficient internal finance (mean score: 3.74; %score 5: 39.1%), and that 
they more strongly depend on internal financing for foreign than for domestic projects (3.71; 
38.1%). Finally, a larger wedge between the cost of external and internal financing for FDI is 
also reported (3.58; 26.3%).  
Insert Table 5 about here 
External financing. 78.3% of the SMEs uses external financing for its FDI projects. 
Bank financing is the most popular source of funds: 39.1% obtain local bank finance in the 
foreign country, while 65.2% attract domestic bank finance.  
 
- Local bank finance: Many SMEs consider local bank financing but state that interest 
charges (4.05; 42.9%) and collateral requirements (4.16; 47.4%) are high (see Table 6). 
Sometimes, local banks refuse to accept domestic guarantees (2.63; 18.8%). Moreover, in 
some countries bank regulation is quite restrictive (3.37; 26.3%), or the bank sector is not well 
enough developed (3.26; 36.8%). For instance, only short or medium term loans are offered, 
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even for the acquisition of long lived assets like buildings. Leasing does not exist in some 
foreign countries. China for example is reported to have a very restrictive banking system, in 
which a substantial equity commitment is required for the bank to consider granting a loan. 
Furthermore, several firms report that obtaining local bank financing is a time consuming 
process (3.61; 33.3%). In the interviews, some SMEs stated that they are hindered by a lack of 
reputation and contacts in the local bank market. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
- Domestic bank finance: A major impediment to attracting domestic bank finance for 
FDI is that the underlying assets often cannot serve as collateral for domestic banks (4.22; 
50.0%, see Table 7). This is partly due to their specificity and the resulting low collateral 
value (3.20; 25.0%). Domestic banks repeatedly require (further) personal collateral, which of 
course is limited by nature or may already be exhausted (3.28; 50.0%). The domestic bank 
usually refuses to lend to the foreign subsidiary for the FDI project and lends to the parent 
firm, thereby shifting the credit risk to the parent (3.79; 31.6%). The limited equity position of 
the firms is another important obstacle for obtaining FDI bank finance (3.14; 28.6%); 
however, raising equity with existing shareholders for a typical family-owned private SME is 
not always feasible, while attracting external equity is often undesirable. Next, domestic banks 
are not really interested in FDI and have a specific domestic focus (3.32; 31.6%), are reluctant 
towards foreign projects because of monitoring issues (3.62; 38.1%) and are not always 
capable of accurately assessing the risks of FDI (3.20; 25.0%). Furthermore, domestic banks 
frequently only consider lending for acquiring fixed assets, and not for any required start up 
costs, market studies, document translation, product adaptation, consulting services or 
business trips (3.28; 27.8%). For many SMEs, these high costs of internationalization present 
a serious barrier to foreign investments (European Commission 2003a). During the interviews, 
not only the refusal of the FDI loan request was mentioned by some SMEs to be problematic, 
but also the long search for financing and the long period of time before a loan request is 
approved. While searching for funds, SMEs cannot completely focus on the core business 
activities and the optimal timing and implementation of FDI may be jeopardized.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
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Our respondents claim to be dependent on banks for financing both domestic and 
foreign investments (3.65; 21.7%) and that banks, on top of interest fees, charge other (fixed) 
costs that are more important for SMEs (3.71; 35.3%, see Table 8). Banks base their credit 
decision for foreign projects to a higher degree on collateral, and not on the projects' 
profitability and cash flows, than for domestic projects (3.63; 36.8% vs. 3.45; 18.2%). For 
small SMEs, banks require more collateral (4.50; 60.0%). If banks judge that the FDI's risk is 
excessive, they will rather ration credit than raise interest rates (4.24; 52.4%). This is in line 
with credit rationing theories: the risk profile of foreign projects does not lead to higher 
interest rates due to the perverse effects this would bring along, but rather to higher collateral 
requirements and credit rationing. For large firms, banks tend to base their credit decision on 
the FDI's profitability (3.64; 28.6%). Moreover, larger firms have some possibilities to 
collateralize the FDI assets (3.50; 30.0%). 
Obtaining domestic bank finance for exporting already presents an issue for some 
SMEs. However, attracting bank finance for FDI projects is even more difficult and in some 
specific countries even impossible (4.13; 53.3%). As could well be expected, banks are more 
willing to provide funds for FDI projects in geographically proximate countries. For banks, 
there seems to be a preference for Eastern Europe over Asia (3.42; 16.7%). Attracting finance 
for Africa-based projects is next to impossible (4.25; 62.5%), while this is rather 
straightforward for US projects (2.00; 0.0%). Interestingly, 31.3% of the SMEs admit that 
they sometimes do not even apply for bank credit for a valuable though complex FDI project 
as they are convinced it will not be granted; this means that the financing constraints reported 
by our SMEs might be an underestimation as credit requests for more complicated or hard-to-
explain foreign projects may never have been submitted. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
According to the SMEs surveyed, the key factor driving the bank's credit decision is 
the firm's ability to pledge collateral (4.65; 70.0%, see Table 9). Raising new equity is also 
helpful in attracting FDI bank financing (4.30; 50.0%) as it facilitates respecting credit limits 
and a minimal solvency level (4.17; 38.9%). Having a good and trustworthy relationship with 
the SME is critical as well (4.30; 65.0%). Other (expected) relevant factors are the country of 
investment (4.40; 50.0%), the presence of a strong currency (4.05; 30.0%), the realism and 
feasibility of the FDI's business plan (4.20; 50.0%), the risks of the FDI project (4.14; 52.4%), 
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the SME's management team (4.00; 42.9%) and financial performance (4.33; 47.6%). An 
SME experienced in FDI will probably have better access to FDI bank finance (3.53; 31.6%), 
and obtaining bank finance is easier when the domestic bank has a physical presence in the 
local country (3.74; 26.3%). 
Insert Table 9 about here 
- Equity finance: 50.0% of the respondents make use of new equity raised with 
existing shareholders. Existing shareholders are claimed to be capable and willing to provide 
new equity financing. However, though the scores reported are not particularly high, raising 
equity with external shareholders seems to be more difficult (2.90; 15.0% vs. 2.67; 14.3%) 
and the respondents may in some cases be reluctant to do this (3.47; 36.8%, see Table 10). 
Even 28.6% of the respondents totally agree that raising equity from new stockholders is the 
last financing option they would consider. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
As raising new equity with current shareholders may not be an option, SMEs might try 
to attract business angel or venture capital finance. Not a single respondent makes use of 
business angel funds, and just two have ever applied for this source of finance. Major 
obstacles to business angel finance are SMEs' lack of knowledge about this source of finance 
(3.50; 25.0%), the perceived high levels of control and monitoring required (3.50; 18.8%), the 
cost of business angel finance (3.33; 26.7%) and the fact that the requested amounts of finance 
are sometimes too large for business angels (2.62; 23.1%, see Table 11). Numerous SMEs are 
reluctant to attract business angel finance (3.19; 31.3%).  
Insert Table 11 about here 
Two SMEs in our sample have attracted venture capital in order to finance their FDI 
projects; however, about half of our sample (52.2%) has ever applied for VC finance. Rather 
than not being capable of raising venture capital for their FDI projects (2.20; 13.3%), our 
respondents show some unwillingness to attract VC (3.06; 35.3%, see Table 12 and 13). There 
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is a substantial preference for financing by an industrial partner over VC financing (4.00; 
40.0%), and VC is to some extent considered as a last resort (3.33; 27.8%). SMEs do not feel 
that VCs are not open to investing in their firm or its FDI projects. By contrast, a VC is more 
interested in SMEs with foreign investments as this may boost returns and enhance exit 
opportunities (4.19; 43.8%). In contrast to the results for banks, firms do not think that VCs 
lack the skills to accurately assess their domestic and foreign investment projects. The major 
obstacles reported by our sample to avoid VC finance is that VC is too expensive (3.44; 
31.3%), especially given the low risk they are seeking (3.60; 40.0%), the VC's option to sell 
off its stake in case of bad results (3.29; 41.2%), and the SME's fear of not being able to buy 
back the VC's shares if needed (3.83; 38.9%). Moreover, VCs are reported to desire a too 
quick exit (3.72; 33.3%), to sometimes employ aggressive investment contracts (3.13; 18.8%) 
and to require much control/monitoring (3.26; 15.8%). Finally, some firms are not well 
informed about VC financing (2.53; 11.8%).  
Insert Table 12 and Table 13 about here 
- Government grants: 30.4% take up some government subsidies in the host country, 
while all firms in our sample make use of government grants in the domestic country.8 
Financial government support for SME FDI projects is definitely most welcome (4.36; 68.2%, 
see Table 14). Several firms report that, without government support, it is very doubtful that 
some of their FDI projects could have been executed (2.77; 27.3%). Our respondents argue 
that it is the government's duty to help resolve the private market's failure to finance SMEs' 
FDI projects (3.59; 31.8%). Critical in government support is that no collateral or guarantees 
are required (4.05; 47.4%). Another way the government can help SMEs is by guaranteeing 
their FDI loans (3.73; 31.8%). An important indirect effect of SMEs obtaining government 
grants for FDI projects it that it facilitates access to private financing, due to an improved 
solvency position (3.79; 36.8%), but even more significantly due to the positive signal 
provided, for example to banks (4.00; 47.4%). During the interviews, one SME explicitly 
                                               
 
8
 The most popular general types of subsidies in Belgium are IWT(Institute for the Promotion of Innovation by 
Science and Technology in Flanders)-grants, used by 47.8% of our sample, and interest subsidies, used by 39.1% 
of our sample. Regarding internationalization, 34.8% of the sample makes use of export subsidies, 47.8% of 
FIT(Flanders Investment & Trade)-support and 21.7% of BCCI(Belgian Corporation for International 
Investment)-support. BCCI usually provides subordinated loans and acts as a co-investor to provide long-term 
co-financing of foreign investments. 17.4% of our sample has received a grant from the Fund Flanders-Asia, a 
Flemish fund that provided support for firms investing in Asia. 
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mentioned that it was next to impossible to obtain bank credit, but that attracting BCCI-
support enabled this.9 Similarly, some other SMEs stated that obtaining interest subsidies 
and/or government guarantees were requested by banks in order to grant loans. In order to be 
effective, it is imperative that the government responds quickly to requests for FDI support 
(4.43; 61.9%). Obtaining FDI government grants/support is harder for small SMEs (4.00; 
50.0%), limited amounts required (3.87; 40.0%) and for certain industries, like services (3.85; 
46.2%). Next to providing financial support, the government must create an environment that 
facilitates and stimulates international trade, for example through the provision of information 
and the promotion of domestic firms in foreign countries (4.05; 52.4%). 
Insert Table 14 about here 
- Partnerships: In addition to providing additional resources and expertise, a domestic 
partner may support FDI projects financially. 21.7% has partnered up with a domestic firm for 
(some of) its foreign projects. Having a domestic partner slightly eases access to domestic 
financing (3.38; 7.7%, see Table 15). 
Insert Table 15 about here 
For FDI projects, partnering up with a host country firm is quite common (43.5%), as 
this allows benefiting from the local partner's legal, cultural and administrative knowledge. 
Additionally, it facilitates access to local finance (3.78; 22.2%) and local government support 
(3.83; 16.7%, see Table 16).  
Insert Table 16 about here 
 
                                               
 
9
 Granting government subsidies or guarantees may send a positive signal to private financiers as  knowledgeable 
government officials certify the recipient, thereby mitigating information problems that otherwise would have 
precluded attracting finance (Lerner 1999).   
 
23 
 
Interviews with supply side  
Evidently, the SME data are self-reported. Though much secondary data used in 
entrepreneurship and strategic management research are self-reported (Ireland, Reutzel, and 
Webb 2005), we recognize the potential for bias. Therefore, we also investigated the topic 
from the supply side of SME-FDI finance as a robustness check on the results obtained with 
SMEs. The findings are in line with those gathered from the demand side. 
According to the financiers, the key criteria for supplying finance for an SME's FDI 
project are the region of investment (political and economic stability), the SME’s management 
(education, experience, track record), the project's cash flow potential, the SME's solvency 
position and its ability to pledge collateral. 
An SME is considered to be more risky than a large firm and this is inflated for foreign 
investments. In case of trouble, it is harder for SMEs to send a manager to the host country. 
Internal control mechanisms and reporting tools are less sophisticated. Consequently, in order 
to attract FDI finance, the owner-manager and his perceived competency are crucial. For an 
international project, an entrepreneur requires above average management skills, knowledge 
of several languages and strategic vision. If the entrepreneur cannot convince the financier of 
its above average capabilities (even if he or she is very capable), obtaining FDI finance will be 
very hard. An essential element in the bank's evaluation is the project's business plan. 
However, for banks it is hard to judge the feasibility of international projects: they are not 
very familiar with other countries and cultures, and monitoring becomes more complex. As a 
result, the substantial information gap between bank and SME is often not bridged, thereby 
limiting the odds of attracting FDI bank finance, and inducing the need for collateral. 
Banks admit that they often question small firms' repayment capacity and that they ask 
for substantial collateral; they acknowledge providing sufficient finance to established SMEs, 
whereas this is less evident for young firms. Though they do support export and import 
activities, banks are not encouraging SMEs to carry out international investments. Domestic 
projects are easier to evaluate, and present fewer legal issues. An excellent business plan for 
the foreign project is required, and even when the loan request is positively evaluated, banks 
tend to provide less funds than asked for. Small businesses are charged higher interest rates 
for FDI projects and collateral requirements are more important. In order to reduce their risk, 
banks invest in the parent firm, or only invest in the foreign subsidiary when the domestic 
parent guarantees the loan. Banks require SMEs to have stronger equity positions than large 
firms; in order for the bank to grant a loan for the foreign investment, new equity may have to 
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be raised. As mentioned before, both providing suitable collateral for an FDI project and 
attracting additional equity present obstacles to many SMEs. 
Venture capitalists indicate that they are not eager to invest in SMEs, as the low 
amount of finance looked for is insufficient to justify the substantial time and efforts a deal 
would require. Only in case of a very high return potential, an investment in an SME would be 
considered. Furthermore, the number of VCs specialized in small businesses has decreased 
over the last few years. In order to compensate for their high (fixed) costs, VCs offer rather 
low valuations or unfavourable investment terms to SMEs, which therefore deem this source 
of finance to be rather unattractive. However, VCs willingly admit that firms with 
international projects offer a more interesting return potential and a wider range of exit 
options. 
The financiers interviewed recognize that there is a failure in the private market for 
financing SMEs' FDI projects, and acknowledge a need for government intervention and 
support. Ideally, the government should bear part of the SMEs' risk and guarantee their loans. 
Alternatively, the government may provide subordinated loans to the SMEs or take equity 
stakes. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In line with the theoretical arguments developed, we find more severe financing 
constraints for FDI than for domestic projects for many SMEs. The volatile returns, 
information problems and lack of collateral that often characterize FDI result in financing 
gaps. The home bias of financiers and the capital gearing method used by banks to evaluate 
SMEs' projects further reinforce financial constraints. Besides, SMEs are clearly 
disadvantaged compared to large firms. Our empirical findings support the theoretical 
proposition, provide an exploration into the nature of the capital market imperfections.    
When internal finance is insufficient for the FDI project, a lot of SMEs often have a 
hard time attracting funds. Excessive collateral requirements, high interest rates or an 
underdeveloped banking system may preclude local bank finance. Domestic banks are often 
not well capable of evaluating FDI and suffer from a home bias. Furthermore, they are 
frequently only willing to finance fixed assets and base credit decisions on a capital gearing 
approach. Typically, the FDI assets cannot serve as collateral. Attracting external equity may 
not be available, too expensive or require giving up control. Venture capitalists are reported to 
offer unattractive investment terms. SMEs often rely on government grants to alleviate the 
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private market's failure to finance FDI projects. Next to a direct positive effect, government 
support provides a positive signal to private financiers. Partnerships, both with domestic and 
local firms are repeatedly utilized, and facilitate access to finance. 
The capital market imperfections found suggest a further need to find ways of 
alleviating barriers to entry to the stock market for SMEs. The government should remove any 
lack of equity stemming from tax and regulatory frameworks (Wagenvoort 2003). 
Furthermore, financial institutions are required to develop creative solutions to the 
information problems involved in SMEs' FDI projects, rather than relying on collateral. 
Establishing close and long-standing relationships serves to reduce information asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders as it provides the bank with a clearer understanding of the 
business' prospects and a better picture of the owner-manager's managerial capabilities 
(Berger and Udell 1995; Binks and Ennew 1996; Boot 2000). Government grants or other 
forms of support may mitigate the effects of the private market's failure; especially, the 
government's lack of a demand for collateral or its guaranteeing of SME commitments are 
crucial. Besides financial help, SMEs are convinced that the government should create a 
framework that facilitates internationalization.  
Our research is subject to a number of limitations. First, the lack of public data on the 
key constructs required us to rely on self-reported data for many variables. We have taken 
various precautions to guard against any potential bias but we cannot fully eliminate the risk 
of biased data. Second, this study's focus on a single country, Belgium, may cast doubt on its 
wider validity. Still, we see no reason why the theoretical foundations for our work should 
obtain more fully in Belgium than somewhere else (Sapienza, De Clercq, and Sandberg 2005). 
Third, our sample is mainly composed of firms that have succeeded in carrying out their FDI 
plans. The true financing gaps faced by SMEs considering international investment might be 
even more substantial. Fourth, the size of the sample used in our study is limited, and for 
instance does not allow us to statistically examine the factors driving SMEs' financing 
constraints for foreign projects. On the other hand, given this paper's explorative nature and 
the fact that the population of SMEs involved in productive FDI is not large, our sample 
cannot be considered small at all. Resolving the limitations present in this study provides a 
fruitful area for further research. 
To end this paper, we present some more avenues for future research. It would be 
interesting to examine the impact of SMEs’ financial constraints for FDI on their 
internationalization strategy and their mode of internationalization. Also, it would be useful to 
find out which variables drive the extent of the FDI constraints faced by SMEs. For instance, 
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human capital helps firms to successfully execute their internationalization strategy (Hitt, 
Bierman, Uhlenbruck, and Shimizu 2005); owner education is an important determinant for 
banks to grant loans to SMEs (Bates 1990). The quality of bank-firm relationships is another 
major determinant for banks credit decisions: SMEs with more concentrated borrowing and 
long-term banking relationships have better credit availability, and lower collateral 
requirements and interest rates (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995; Harhoff and 
Körting 1998). Firms in an early stage of internationalization have more difficulties in 
attracting finance for export activities (Bilkey and Tesar 1977). Similarly, it could be expected 
that first entering an international market presents more severe financing issues. Equivalently, 
substantial financing constraints are likely for SMEs expanding to dissimilar international 
markets due to the high costs and risks of managing locational diversity. Next to this, local 
bank finance deserves further research attention. As shown in this paper, this is in important 
source of financing for international investments; however, there is a void in the literature on 
this topic. 
This paper must be considered as an explorative inquiry into the extent and the nature 
of the financial constraints that SMEs face for their FDI projects. Future studies can draw 
from this research and should deploy alternative and in-depth research methodologies in order 
to gain a better and more complete understanding of this highly relevant topic.  
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TABLE 1 
Industry Classification of the Sample 
Nace Bel  
Industry 
Code 
Nace Bel 
Industry Description 
Number of firms 
in interviewed 
sample 
Number of firms 
in surveyed 
sample 
01 
Agriculture, hunting and related service 
activities 2 1 
15 
Manufacture of food products and 
beverages 5 3 
18 
Manufacture of wearing apparel/ 
dressing and dyeing of fur 1 1 
22 
Publishing, printing and reproduction 
of recorded media 1 1 
25 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products 1 1 
28 
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 7 6 
29 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment  4 2 
31 
Manufacture of electrical machinery 
and apparatus  1  
32 
Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and 
apparatus 2 1 
34 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers 2 2 
35 
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 1 1 
36 Manufacture of furniture 2 1 
45 Construction 2 1 
51 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, 
except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 5 2 
60 Land transport/ transport via pipelines 1 1 
72 Computer and related activities 1 1 
This table provides an overview of the industries in which our interviewed (32 SMEs) and surveyed sample (23 
SMEs) are active, according to the Nace Bel Industry Code and Description. 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Firm Characteristics 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
Number of employees 
- interview sample 
-  questionnaire sample 
 
96 
165 
 
137 
208 
 
0 
0 
 
41 
73 
 
700 
700 
Total sales (in euro) 
- interview sample 
-  questionnaire sample 
 
13,881,359 
22,063,745 
 
13,588,263 
24,671,227 
 
100,000 
185,000 
 
8,480,000 
10,900,000 
 
48,458,232 
84,000,000 
Total assets (in euro) 
- interview sample 
-  questionnaire sample 
 
9,062,853 
13,998,976 
 
9,415,279 
12,182,480 
 
12,500 
378,468 
 
4,959,500 
12,300,000 
 
32,300,000 
37,400,000 
This table provides an overview of firm characteristics for our interviewed (32 SMEs) and surveyed sample (23 
SMEs). Minimum, mean, median, maximum and standard deviation of the number of employees, total sales and 
total assets (at end of year 2005) are reported. 
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TABLE 3 
Country of FDI 
Country of investment Number of firms in 
interviewed sample 
Number of firms in 
surveyed sample 
Egypt 1  
Romania 4 3 
Ukraine 1 1 
Bulgaria 1 1 
Guinea 1  
Slovakia 3 2 
China 8 5 
USA 1  
Hungary 3 3 
Norway 1 1 
Portugal 1 1 
Russia 1 1 
Brasil 1 1 
Algeria 1 1 
Ghana 1 1 
Sri Lanka 1 1 
Zambia 1 1 
Missing 1  
This table provides an overview of the country of investment of the most recent FDI project for our interviewed 
(32 SMEs) and surveyed sample (23 SMEs).  
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TABLE 4 
Financing Constraints Faced by SMEs Pursuing FDI: General Overview 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- my SME faces financing constraints 
for its FDI projects 
3.61 0.040 13.0 30.4 
- my SME faces financing constraints 
for its domestic projects 
2.26 0.012 34.8 8.7 
- financing problems for FDI hinder 
my SME's growth  
3.57 0.050 8.7 34.8 
- the FDI financing constraints of my 
SME are more severe than for 
* my SME's domestic projects 
* large firms 
 
 
3.77 
4.00 
 
 
0.006 
0.000 
 
 
4.5 
4.8 
 
 
31.8 
33.3 
- my SME sometimes makes use of 
suboptimal and expensive sources of 
finance since it cannot attract standard 
types of financing for its domestic 
projects  
1.82 0.000 50.0 4.5 
- my SME sometimes makes use of 
suboptimal and expensive sources of 
finance since it cannot attract standard 
types of financing for its foreign 
projects 
2.74 0.399 31.8 13.6 
- there is a clear failure in the private 
market to finance SMEs' FDI projects  
3.94 0.003 0.0 44.4 
This table provides a general overview of the financing constraints faced by SMEs that carry out foreign direct 
investments, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, 
with a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I totally agree 
with the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance indicates whether 
the mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). % score 1 (totally 
disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this statement, while % score 5 
(totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for this statement. 
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TABLE 5 
Internal Financing of FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- if my SME would generate     
insufficient internal funds, it would be 
very hard to finance the FDI project 
3.74 0.008 0.0 39.1 
- for financing FDI, my SME is more 
dependent on internal funds than for 
domestic projects (with comparable 
risk)  
3.71 0.025 4.8 38.1 
- for domestic projects, the cost of 
external financing is markedly higher 
than internal financing   
3.32 0.268 5.3 15.8 
- there is a larger wedge between the 
cost of external and internal financing 
for my SME's FDI projects  
3.58 0.061 5.3 26.3 
This table provides an overview of statements relating to internal financing of FDI projects by the SMEs in our 
sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with 
a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I totally agree with 
the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance indicates whether the 
mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). % score 1 (totally 
disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this statement, while % score 5 
(totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for this statement. 
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TABLE 6 
Impediments to Attracting Local Bank Financing for FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- local banks have high collateral 
requirements 
4.16 0.000 5.3 47.4 
- local banks charge high interests  4.05 0.000 0.0 42.9 
- the amount of the loan is too small  2.30 0.031 35.0 10.0 
- my SME has a lack of reputation and 
contacts in the local bank market   
3.00 1.000 15.0 25.0 
- local banks refuse to accept domestic 
guarantees 
2.63 0.333 31.3 18.8 
- local bank regulation is too 
restrictive  
3.37 0.247 10.5 26.3 
- the local bank sector is not well 
enough developed (for example long 
term loans and leasing are not offered)  
3.26 0.490 21.1 36.8 
- my SME is not familiar with local 
bank regulation  
2.81 0.530 23.8 14.3 
- obtaining local bank financing is too 
time consuming 
3.61 0.069 5.6 33.3 
- there is corruption at local banks 2.11 0.019 55.6 11.1 
This table provides an overview of statements relating to local bank financing of FDI projects by the SMEs in 
our sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, 
with a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I totally agree 
with the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance indicates whether 
the mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). % score 1 (totally 
disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this statement, while % score 5 
(totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for this statement. 
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TABLE 7 
Impediments to Attracting Domestic Bank Financing for FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- the domestic bank refuses to lend to 
the foreign subsidiary, always lends to 
domestic parent firm 
3.79 0.012 5.3 31.6 
- FDI assets cannot serve as collateral  4.22 0.000 0.0 50.0 
- FDI assets are very specific and 
therefore have low collateral value  
3.20 0.530 15.0 25.0 
- the domestic bank requires domestic 
assets as collateral, but these have 
already been collateralized 
2.41 0.066 29.4 0.0 
- the domestic bank requires (further) 
personal collateral for the FDI project 
3.28 0.531 27.8 50.0 
- the limited equity of my SME 
hinders obtaining FDI bank financing  
3.14 0.685 23.8 28.6 
- domestic banks are hardly interested 
in FDI, they have a purely domestic 
focus 
3.32 0.357 10.5 31.6 
- domestic banks are reluctant towards 
FDI due to monitoring issues 
3.62 0.044 4.8 38.1 
- domestic banks are not equipped to 
accurately assess the risks of FDI 
3.20 0.494 10.0 25.0 
- domestic banks only consider 
lending for acquiring fixed assets, and 
not for start up costs, market studies, 
consulting services and business trips 
required  
3.28 0.399 11.1 27.8 
- the long lasting search for FDI 
financing is an obstacle to my SME 
3.00 1.000 13.6 22.7 
- the long period of time required 
before a loan request gets approval 
presents an obstacle to my SME 
3.00 1.000 13.6 18.2 
This table provides an overview of impediments relating to domestic bank financing of FDI projects by the 
SMEs in our sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The impediments were scored on a 5-point 
Likert scale, with a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I 
totally agree with the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance 
indicates whether the mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). 
% score 1 (totally disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this 
statement, while % score 5 (totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for 
this statement. 
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TABLE 8 
Attracting Domestic Bank Financing for FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- my SME is very dependent on banks for 
financing domestic and foreign 
investments 
3.65 0.008 4.3 21.7 
- if banks judge that the project's risk is too 
high, they will rather ration credit than 
raise interest rates  
4.24 0.000 0.0 52.4 
- on top of interest fees, banks charge other 
(fixed) costs that are more important for 
small than for large firms  
3.71 0.023 0.0 35.3 
- obtaining bank financing for export 
activities is not a problem at all 
2.65 0.251 23.5 5.9 
- by raising the SME's equity, FDI bank 
financing would be facilitated 
3.42 0.190 5.3 31.6 
- banks have more substantial collateral 
requirement for small SMEs 
4.50 0.000 0.0 60.0 
- the stronger my SME's growth, the higher 
the financing constraints experienced with 
banks 
3.55 0.030 4.5 18.2 
- my bank's credit decision for domestic 
projects  is based on collateral, and not on 
the projects' profitability and cash flows  
3.45 0.066 4.5 18.2 
- my bank's credit decision for foreign 
projects  is based on collateral, and not on 
the projects' profitability and cash flows 
3.63 0.048 5.3 36.8 
- banks do not question large firms' 
repayment potential 
3.06 0.868 12.5 25.0 
- for large firms, banks base their credit 
decision on the profitability and cash flows 
of their FDI projects 
3.64 0.095 14.3 28.6 
- large firms can use FDI assets as 
collateral for the loan  
3.50 0.273 10.0 30.0 
- for FDI projects in some specific 
countries, it is impossible to attract bank 
financing  
4.13 0.003 6.7 53.3 
- banks would rather grant a loan for a FDI 
project  
* in a neighbouring country than in another 
West-European country 
* in West Europe than in East Europe 
* in East Europe than in Asia  
 
 
3.93 
 
3.87 
3.42 
 
 
0.010 
 
0.011 
0.210 
 
 
6.7 
 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
40.0 
 
37.5 
16.7 
- obtaining bank financing for FDI  
* in the US is problematic 
* in Africa is problematic 
 
2.00 
4.25 
 
0.189 
0.038 
 
60.0 
12.5 
 
0.0 
62.5 
- my SME sometimes does not ask for 
bank credit for a valuable though complex 
FDI project as we know it will not be 
granted  
2.81 0.682 37.5 31.3 
This table provides an overview of statements relating to domestic bank financing of FDI projects by the SMEs 
in our sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert 
scale, with a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I 
totally agree with the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance 
indicates whether the mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). 
% score 1 (totally disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this 
statement, while % score 5 (totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for 
this statement. 
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TABLE 9 
Factors Domestic Banks Consider in Evaluating Loan Requests for FDI Projects, 
According to SMEs 
To what extent do you agree that domestic banks consider the following factors in evaluating 
loan requests for FDI projects? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- country of investment, economic and 
political stability 
4.40 0.000 0.0 50.0 
- presence of strong currency in local 
country 
4.05 0.000 0.0 30.0 
- type of assets to be financed 3.63 0.024 0.0 26.3 
- sector of investment 3.81 0.001 0.0 23.8 
- realism and feasibility of the FDI's 
business plan 
4.20 0.000 5.0 50.0 
- trust and relationship between SME 
and bank 
4.30 0.000 0.0 65.0 
- respecting credit limits and minimal 
solvency level 
4.17 0.000 5.6 38.9 
- strength of the underlying product  3.29 0.315 14.3 14.3 
- sales potential on local market 3.00 1.000 23.8 14.3 
- the SME's financial performance 4.33 0.000 0.0 47.6 
- management team of the SME 4.00 0.001 9.5 42.9 
- presence of the domestic bank in the 
local country 
3.74 0.009 5.3 26.3 
- motives behind FDI project 3.55 0.053 10.0 20.0 
- risks of the FDI project 4.14 0.000 4.8 52.4 
- the SME's ability to pledge collateral  4.65 0.000 0.0 70.0 
- raise equity next to debt for the FDI 
project  
4.30 0.000 0.0 50.0 
- the SME's experience with FDI 3.53 0.086 5.3 31.6 
This table provides an overview of the factors that domestic banks consider in evaluating loan requests for FDI 
projects, according to SMEs that carry out foreign direct investments, as reported in 23 questionnaires we 
received. The factors were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree 
with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I totally agree with the statement”. Mean score is the average 
score given by the respondents. Significance indicates whether the mean score is statistically significantly 
different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). % score 1 (totally disagree) represents the percentage of 
respondents that have marked a 1 score for this statement, while % score 5 (totally agree) shows the percentage 
of respondents that have marked a 5 score for this statement. 
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TABLE 10 
External Financing of FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- raising my SME's equity is hard 3.27 0.229 4.5 9.1 
- our current shareholders cannot buy 
new shares 
2.67 0.329 33.3 14.3 
- our current shareholders do not want 
to buy new shares 
2.33 0.016 28.6 4.8 
- my SME cannot raise equity with 
new external shareholders  
2.90 0.733 15.0 15.0 
- my SME does not want to raise 
equity with new external shareholders 
3.47 0.187 15.8 36.8 
- raise equity with new shareholders is 
the final financing option that my 
SME would look for 
3.14 0.666 14.3 28.6 
This table provides an overview of statements relating to external financing of FDI projects by the SMEs in our 
sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with 
a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I totally agree with 
the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance indicates whether the 
mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). % score 1 (totally 
disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this statement, while % score 5 
(totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for this statement. 
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TABLE 11 
Impediments to Business Angel Financing of FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- my SME cannot raise equity with 
business angels 
2.15 0.059 46.2 15.4 
- my SME does not want to raise 
equity with business angels 
3.19 0.654 25.0 31.3 
- my SME is unfamiliar with business 
angel financing  
3.50 0.086 10.0 25.0 
- the amount to be financed is too 
small for business angel financing 
2.58 0.295 25.0 8.3 
- the amount to be financed is too 
large for business angel financing  
2.62 0.406 38.5 23.1 
- business angel financing is too 
expensive 
3.33 0.371 13.3 26.7 
- business angels require too much 
control and monitoring  
3.50 0.135 12.5 18.8 
This table provides an overview of impediments relating to business angel financing of FDI projects by the 
SMEs in our sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point 
Likert scale, with a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I 
totally agree with the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance 
indicates whether the mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). 
% score 1 (totally disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this 
statement, while % score 5 (totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for 
this statement. 
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TABLE 12 
Impediments to Venture Capital Financing of FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- venture capitalists (VCs)  
* are not open to investing in my SME 
* are not open to my SME's FDI 
   projects 
* do not have the skills to accurately 
assess our domestic investment 
projects  
* do not have the skills to accurately 
assess our foreign investment projects 
* require too much control and 
monitoring 
* refuse to take minority stakes 
* employ too aggressive investment 
contracts   
* desire a too quick exit 
* want to pursue a too risky expansion 
of my SME 
* take too little risk compared to the 
return they seek 
* may abandon or sell off their stake 
in case of low performance  
 
2.56 
2.61 
 
2.06 
 
 
2.32 
 
3.26 
 
2.25 
3.13 
 
3.72 
2.79 
 
3.60 
 
3.29 
 
0.227 
0.310 
 
0.009 
 
 
0.050 
 
0.426 
 
0.018 
0.751 
 
0.033 
0.583 
 
0.132 
 
0.452 
 
27.8 
33.3 
 
41.2 
 
 
36.8 
 
21.1 
 
25.0 
25.0 
 
11.1 
21.4 
 
13.3 
 
11.8 
 
16.7 
16.7 
 
10.5 
 
 
10.5 
 
15.8 
 
6.3 
18.8 
 
33.3 
21.4 
 
40.0 
 
41.2 
- my SME does not want to be 
reporting to the VC all the time  
3.32 0.391 21.1 31.6 
- my SME cannot raise equity with a 
VC 
2.20 0.047 40.0 13.3 
- my SME does not want to raise 
equity with a VC 
3.06 0.891 29.4 35.3 
- my SME is unfamiliar with VC 
financing  
2.53 0.203 35.3 11.8 
- the amount to be financed is too 
small for VC financing 
2.29 0.035 28.6 0.0 
- the amount to be financed is too 
large for VC financing  
1.64 0.000 50.0 0.0 
- VC is too expensive 3.44 0.219 12.5 31.3 
- my SME fears to have trouble later 
buying out the VC 
3.83 0.012 5.6 38.9 
This table provides an overview of impediments relating to venture capital financing of FDI projects by the 
SMEs in our sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point 
Likert scale, with a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I 
totally agree with the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance 
indicates whether the mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). 
% score 1 (totally disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this 
statement, while % score 5 (totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for 
this statement. 
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TABLE 13 
Venture Capital Financing of FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- my SME prefers financing by an 
industrial partner over VC financing 
4.00 0.001 5.0 40.0 
- I only consider attracting VC 
financing when all other financing 
sources have been exhausted and if it 
is the only alternative left to finance 
the FDI project 
3.33 0.331 11.1 27.8 
- a VC is more interested in an SME 
that does FDI projects as this boosts 
potential returns and improves exit 
opportunities   
4.19 0.000 0.0 43.8 
This table provides an overview of statements relating to venture capital financing of FDI projects by the SMEs 
in our sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert 
scale, with a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I 
totally agree with the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance 
indicates whether the mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). 
% score 1 (totally disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this 
statement, while % score 5 (totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for 
this statement. 
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TABLE 14 
Government Grants for FDI Financing 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- financial government support for my 
SME's FDI projects is most welcome 
4.36 0.000 4.5 68.2 
- my SME is well informed about the 
different types of government support for 
FDI projects 
3.43 0.076 4.3 17.4 
- the people working at  government 
institutions that provide FDI support are an 
added value to my international plans  
3.19 0.540 14.3 23.8 
- it's the government's duty to help resolve 
the private market's failure to finance 
SMEs' FDI projects  
3.59 0.050 9.1 31.8 
- the government should bear part of the 
SME's FDI project risk 
3.27 0.342 9.1 22.7 
- the government should guarantee the 
SME's loan for the FDI project  
3.73 0.012 4.5 31.8 
- the government needs to respond quickly 
to requests for FDI support  
4.43 0.000 4.8 61.9 
- the government must create an 
environment that facilitates and stimulates 
international trade (for example 
information provision, promote domestic 
firms in foreign countries,.. 
4.05 0.001 4.8 52.4 
- sufficient government support (for 
example at BCCI) can only be found for 
large projects and amounts 
3.60 0.083 10.0 40.0 
- the interest that the BCCI asks for its 
subordinated debt is too high   
3.83 0.005 5.6 27.8 
- it is important that the BCCI does not ask 
for collateral or guarantees 
4.05 0.001 5.3 47.4 
- obtaining government grants for FDI 
projects eases access to private financing 
since 
* it improves my solvency position 
* it provides a good signal (for example to 
banks)  
 
 
 
3.79 
4.00 
 
 
 
0.012 
0.002 
 
 
 
5.3 
5.3 
 
 
 
36.8 
47.4 
- obtaining government grants and support 
for FDI projects is harder for 
* small SMEs 
* limited amounts required 
* certain industries (for example services) 
 
 
4.00 
3.87 
3.85 
 
 
0.002 
0.013 
0.043 
 
 
5.6 
0.0 
7.7 
 
 
50.0 
40.0 
46.2 
- the administrative burden and the efforts 
required for seeking for government 
support do not compensate for the benefits 
obtained 
3.14 0.642 19.0 14.3 
- without government support, it is very 
doubtful that some of my FDI projects 
could be carried forward 
2.77 0.528 31.8 27.3 
This table provides an overview of statements relating to government grants for FDI projects by the SMEs in our 
sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with 
a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I totally agree with 
the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance indicates whether the 
mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). % score 1 (totally 
disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this statement, while % score 5 
(totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for this statement. 
50 
 
TABLE 15 
Domestic partners for FDI projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- a domestic partner facilitates 
obtaining 
* domestic financing 
* local financing in the FDI country  
* domestic government support/grants 
* local government support/grants 
 
 
3.38 
2.67 
2.64 
2.33 
 
 
0.209 
0.394 
0.349 
0.054 
 
 
7.7 
25.0 
18.2 
25.0 
 
 
7.7 
8.3 
9.1 
0.0 
This table provides an overview of statements relating to domestic partners for FDI projects by the SMEs in our 
sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with 
a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I totally agree with 
the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance indicates whether the 
mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). % score 1 (totally 
disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this statement, while % score 5 
(totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for this statement. 
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TABLE 16 
Local Partners for FDI Projects 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1: totally disagree; 5: totally agree) 
Item Mean  
score 
Significance % score 1  
(totally disagree) 
% score 5 
(totally agree) 
- a local partner facilitates obtaining 
* domestic financing 
* local financing in the FDI country  
* domestic government support/grants 
* local government support/grants 
 
1.71 
3.78 
1.69 
3.83 
 
0.001 
0.003 
0.000 
0.002 
 
57.1 
0.0 
46.2 
5.6 
 
0.0 
22.2 
0.0 
16.7 
This table provides an overview of statements relating to local partners for FDI projects by the SMEs in our 
sample, as reported in 23 questionnaires we received. The statements were scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with 
a score of 1 being equal to “I totally disagree with the statement”, and a score of 5 indicating “I totally agree with 
the statement”. Mean score is the average score given by the respondents. Significance indicates whether the 
mean score is statistically significantly different from 3 (p-value from a one sample t-test). % score 1 (totally 
disagree) represents the percentage of respondents that have marked a 1 score for this statement, while % score 5 
(totally agree) shows the percentage of respondents that have marked a 5 score for this statement. 
 
 
 
 
